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Abstract
Conformity behavior, i.e., the agreement between an individual’s choices and the prevailing
behavior of  a reference group, is a commonly observed phenomenon. Though some types
of  social interactions may give raise to speciﬁc incentives to adopt either a majoritarian or
a contrarian behavior, we want to investigate whether the same behavioral pattern emerges
even when no economic motivator is present.
To accomplish this task, we employ an experimental Vickrey median price auction
designed to provide incentives to reveal individual preferences truthfully. Whereas we feed
the control group with just the median price, we give out additional information on other
players’ bids for those in the treated groups. These informations are designed to provide
hints at revising individual bids.
Our main results point to a strong tendency of  the individuals to adapt their behavior to
those of  the individuals which can be observed. Moreover, although a clear shaping effect
(a regression toward the median price) does emerge for the control group, the provision of
information about the actual behavior of  a sample of  the relevant group is able to minimize
or neutralize the shaping effect. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that players adjust to a divergence
between their bids and the average bid of  a reference group by a factor of  47.4%—87.3%.
These ﬁgures point to a relevant role for conformity in group behavior.
Keywords: Endogenous preferences, shaping effect, social conformity, Vickrey auction.
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1 Introduction
The existence of  anomalies that are at odds with standard theories of  preferences is well
known (e.g. Allais (1953); Kahneman and Tversky (1979)), as it is well known that such
anomalies tend to disappear in experimental repeated markets. According to Loomes
et al. (2003), the vanishing of  anomalies during repetition may be explained by ground-
ing either in the hypothesis of  context independent preferences (the discovered preferences
hypothesis or one of  its variant, e.g. the market discipline hypothesis) or in the hypothesis that
preferences are endogenous to the institutions through which they are elicited (the shap-
ing hypothesis). According to this latter hypothesis, due to the lack of  well-articulated
preferences any elicitation mechanism inevitably produces responses in which norma-
tively irrelevant signals, i.e. signals not conveying any information on the individuals’
actual satisfaction (e.g. the market prices) act as cues affecting the elicited values. Recent
evidence has provided sound evidence in support of  the Shaping hypothesis (Loomes
et al., 2010; Tufano, 2010).
Grounding in Butler and Loomes (2007), in this paper we generalize the process of
preference formation in response to cues accruing from the market by considering the
shaping effect as a particular case of conformity, to be meant as an individual’s intrinsic
tendency to adapt her prior knowledge and behavior to the most frequent behavioral
pattern in a population (Efferson et al., 2008).
Although there is widespread evidence of  conformity both among human (Asch, 1956;
Haun et al., 2013) and nonhuman animals (van de Waal et al., 2013; Morgan and Laland,
2012), quite surprisingly little attention has been paid to this phenomenon by scholars
involved in the exogenous versus the endogenous preference formation dispute. 1 Our
purpose is to ﬁll this gap, by showing how conformity affects the outcome of  an elicitation
mechanism, even if  there is no incentive for the individuals to conform.
We run an experiment based on a variant of  the Vickrey auction (i.e. median price
auction) to test how the information about the bidding behavior of  a reference group
affects the elicited values of  the relevant individual.
Our main results point to a strong effect of  conformity, that is a strong tendency to
adjust the stated values to those of  the individuals one can observe. Moreover, although a
clear shaping effect emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision
of  information about the actual behavior of  a reference group neutralizes the shaping
effect. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that players adjust to a divergence between their bids and the
average bid of  a reference group by a factor of  47.4%—87.3%. These ﬁgures point to a
relevant role for conformity in group behavior.
1Indeed, in standard economic literature (with due exception of  Klick and Parisi (2008)) conformity
is either the upshot of  a rational calculation that takes into account the disutility deriving from punish-
ment and social exclusion (Bernheim, 1998), or a way to economize on the costs of  acquiring information
(Bikhchandani et al., 1998). These stances are grounded in the assumption of  an exogenously given set of
well-deﬁned preferences.
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2 Experimental design
In the next section we brieﬂy report the results from a paper and pencil pilot experiment
which was conducted on the 30th June 2013, from 2.00 p.m. to 6.00 p.m., at the Depart-
ment of  Political Science of  the University of  Naples Federico II. All funding required to
cover expenses and payments was provided by the authors. Recruitment was done by
informally asking students attending either the course of  economic policy or the course
of  civil law to participate in the experiment. Participation was voluntary and no fee was
granted.
Subjects were involved in a variant of  the Vickrey (1961) selling auction with the fol-
lowing characteristics. In each of  eight market periods (rounds) subjects were asked to
submit monetary bids corresponding to their willingness to accept an auctioned bad, 60
ml of  an harmless but distasting mixture of  Gatorade and Vinegar (Ariely et al., 2003).
Before running the ﬁrst market period subjects were asked to drink a 30 ml sample of  the
mixture. This was a necessary condition for participation.
Subjects bids were obtained through forms containing a a sequence of  questions of
the following kind: “Would you be willing to accept €x to drink the liquid?” The values
of x ranged from a minimum of  (€0.20) to a maximum of  (€3.00). To any question of
the sequence each individual could either answer yes or no before reporting the value
of  her highest rejected price — i.e., the maximum price at which she was not willing to
drink the liquid — at the bottom of  the form. In what follows we adopt the convention
of  identifying the highest rejected price of  a given individual in a particular round as the
bid of  that individual in that round.
In each market period, the price was set in correspondence of  the median bid. Sub-
jects whose bids were lower than the market price could in principle obtain the auctioned
bad receiving a payment in cash equivalent to the market price. At the end of  any market
period a random experiment determined with probability 0.15 whether that period was
indeed relevant for trading. In that case, individuals reporting an highest rejected price
lower than the market price were asked to drink the liquid with the promise of  a payment
in cash equal to the current market price at the end of  the experiment. There was a total
of  seven relevant periods (two relevant periods both in the ﬁrst and the third Sessions,
three relevant periods in the second session). The ﬁrst of  the three experimental Sessions
lasted about 45 minutes. Each of  the last two lasted about one hour and a half. The
average payment per subject was €2.70.
At the beginning of  the experiment, the whole group made of  28 participant was
summoned in the classroom and was randomly split into three groups of  individuals (7,
9, 12), with the ﬁrst group assigned to control and the others to the alternative treatments.
The ﬁrst experimental session involved the control group. The other participants were
required to leave the classroom and to show up at the door separately at agreed times.
At the end of  any market period the prevailing price was made public. It was written
on the blackboard and any subject could observe it until the end of  the following market
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period, when another price was established. This was the only information provided to
subjects belonging to the control group.
Individuals belonging to the treatment groups were given additional information. In
particular, subjects belonging to the ﬁrst treatment group, whose bids were below (above)
the market price at the end of  the previous market period, could observe, from the third
period on, all the bids below (above) the market price in that period. They could not infer
who did a particular bid. Neither they were informed that only information of  a given
type was given to them. They simply received an additional sheet of  paper in which
it was stated that some of  their colleagues had done the reported bids in the previous
market period.
Subjects belonging to the second treatment group received additional information
after the third period, when the distribution of  the individuals’ preferences should have
been more stable. In particular, those making the 2nd and the 3rd lowest bids (resp. the
7th and the 8th highest bids) in the third market period, received, from that period on,
information concerning the bids above (resp. below) the market price in the previous
period.
In what follows, we will use the abbreviations: CG(Control Group), TG1(Treatment
Group 1), and TG2(Treatment Group 2).
3 Results
The main descriptors of  the experimental groups are collected in table 1, while the ba-
sic statistical tests for their mean and variance are reported in table 2. The values of
monetary variables are expressed in euros.
3.1 Median price
Finding 1 (Median price for CG and TG1) The median prices of CG and TG1 are identical.
After the ﬁrst round in which no previous median price was observable, both groups
instantly converged to the median price of  2.8. This occurrence is particularly valuable,
since it exposed CG and the TG1 to the same median market price, with the TG1 receiving
just a single type of  additional information. Basically, the contrast between TG1 and CG
implements an almost ideal ceteris paribus condition, as it is evident in ﬁgure 3.
Finding 2 (Sticky convergence of TG2 median price) The convergence of TG2’s me-
dian price is slow.
Though the median prices of CG and TG2 do converge, the speed of  convergence of
TG2 is remarkably slower: this happened only from the sixth round onward, whereas it
happened four rounds before for TG1. This testiﬁes how the treatment administered to
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TG2 exacerbates the tendency to taking into account the normatively irrelevant infor-
mation derived by others’ players bids.
3.2 Control group
The only information provided by the conductors to the control group was the median
price which prevailed at the previous round. Rounds 3 and 6 were found relevant and
winners were required to drink.
Finding 3 (Shaping effect 1) The value of  variance of  the bids in theCG steadily declines across
rounds.
The graphical depiction of  the standard deviation of  the control group can be seen in
ﬁgure 2. Its values range from 0.9 in the ﬁrst round from 0.4 in the last one. This marked
decline appears as a conﬁrmation of  the shaping hypothesis. This result qualiﬁes the
control group as an empirically valid counterfactual for the treated groups.
Finding 4 (Shaping effect 2) The average value of  bids in the CG steadily converges toward the
market median price.
This can be considered as sound evidence that the information on market median price,
though not normatively relevant, strongly shaped individual bids.
3.3 First treatment group
The TG1 is our ﬁrst treated group. All other conditions being equal to the control group,
the TG1 was given additional information according to the following scheme:
1. the participants whose bids were below the market median price at the previous
round were provided with anonymous information on bids below the market me-
dian price;
2. the participants whose bids were above the market median price at the previous
round were provided with anonymous information on bids above the market me-
dian price;
3. the participants whose bids were exactly equal to the market median price at the
previous round were given no additional information.
Our prior was that if  a conformity effect were present, the provision of  normatively ir-
relevant information should further increase (decrease) the average bids for the players
above (below) the median. Since the median is an impersonal summary statistic for the
distribution of  bids, some bidders could be tempted to extract information from actual
non-median bids and to revise their own bids accordingly. Therefore, we expected a
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higher variance for TG1 compared to CG, since the additional information was supposed
to prevent full convergence toward the median price.
Finding 5 (Variance of TG1) The variance of  the TG1 is stationary, falling in the range of  0.8
to 1.0.
Compared to the control group, the variance of  the TG1 does not exhibit any tendence
toward decline and remains substantially stable across rounds (see ﬁgure 2). The test for
equality of  variances proves that the variance for TG1 is 26% higher than the variance for
the CG (p-value for the unilateral test equal to 0.038). Since the players with bids above
(below) the median were given information on other fellow participants which also bid
above (below) the median, this resulted in higher (lower) bids for their reference group.
Across rounds, this resulted in nondecreasing overall variance of  bids, which completely
offsets the shaping effect.
3.4 Second treatment group
With our second treatment TG2 we intended to test whether conformity simply reinforces
a previously stated preference, as in the case of TG1, or is it also capable of  radically
changing them. All other conditions being equal to the control group, the TG2 was
provided with additional information which is somewhat symmetrical if  compared to
TG1:
1. the participants whose bids were below the market median price at the previous
round were provided with anonymous information on bids above the market me-
dian price;
2. the participants whose bids were above the market median price at the previous
round were provided with anonymous information on bids below the market me-
dian price;
3. the participants whose bids were exactly equal to the market median price at the
previous round were given no additional information.
In the case of TG1, each non-median player was given information about her fellow
players whose evaluations were included in the same half  of  distribution: the mean of
these bids could be slightly higher or lower than her bid. By contrast, in the case of TG2,
the mean of  bids given as extra information was strictly lower for those who were above
the median and strictly higher for those below the median. Also in this case, we expected
that bidders would try to extract relevant information from a set of  similar bids, resulting
in lower (higher) bids for those above (below) the median and a lower overall variance
compared to the CG.
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Finding 6 (Variance of TG2) Compared to CG, the variance of TG2 is strictly lower.
Our prior was that if  a strong conformity effect were present, the provision of  this
alternative kind of  extraneous information should result in higher (lower) average bids
for those who received information on bids above (below) the median and a lower overall
variance compared to the CG.
This effect seems to be remarkably stable over the rounds, as depicted in ﬁgure 2:
this graph shows a clear pattern, with the standard deviation of TG2 closely mimicking
the time path of CG, except for a steadily lower value. The difference in variance is
reported in table 2, with the overall variance of TG2 being 13,9% lower than the control
group (p =0.118).
3.5 Regression analysis
In a further evaluation of  our hypothesis of  pervasive conformity in the treated groups, we
employ an econometric model to test the impact of  normatively irrelevant information on
the behavior of  bidders. Speciﬁcally, we test whether the ﬁrst difference in an individual’s
bids (namely, th term bt   bt 1) is responsive to the kind of  information provided in the
experimental setting. We run the following regression model, derived in a companion
theoretical paper that can be asked directly to the authors:
bt   bt 1 =  + 
 
pmedt 1   bt 1

+ 
rt 1   bt 1
1 + rt 1
+ "t (1)
where , , and  are constants to be estimated, pmedt 1 is the median price at previous
round, rt 1 is the mean value of  the bids provided as extra information, rt 1 is their
standard deviation, and " is an i.i.d. error term.
The ﬁrst term on the right side of  eq. (1), (pmedt 1   bt 1) is the usual effect of regression
toward the median, namely the shaping effect. As this difference grows positive, next round’s
bid is adjusted upward when  > 0.
The term rt 1   bt 1)/(1 + rt 1) captures the value of  the additional normatively
irrelevant information for a bidder, as provided under the form of  a list of  bids made
by other players. It is measured by the simple distance between the mean of  the bids
provided as information to the bidders above and below the median, discounted by its
standard deviation, which functions as a metric for the dispersion of  the signal in the
reference group. When  > 0 we ﬁnd evidence of  a conformity effect.
3.5.1 Estimation
Table 3 reports estimates results for the control group. In this case, the model estimated
was simply
bt   bt 1 =  + 
 
pmedt 1   bt 1

+ "t (2)
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since no additional information was given to any bidder, except for the median price.
We ﬁnd that bidders adjust their current bid by a factor of  38% of  the difference between
the previous round’s median price and bid. This value will serve as a benchmark for the
evaluation of  subsequent treatment effects.
The results for the treated groups are reported in table 4. In the design of  our
empirical models we made two fundamental choices: which observations to include
and which counterfactual to employ. In our design the median bidders did not re-
ceive any additional information besides the median price: consequently, the term
(rt 1   bt 1)/(1 + rt 1) is missing for them. To estimate our model, we implement
two alternative speciﬁcations:
1. We set the observations for the median bidders equal to zero and added a dummy
for being non-median. The results are reported in columns 2–5.
2. We excluded the observations for the median bidders altogether. The correspond-
ing results are reported in columns 6–9.
Regarding the choice of  an appropriate counterfactual, we estimated the models with
and without median bidders using
1. a basic ﬁxed effects panel estimator;
2. a ﬁxed effects panel estimator that includes the basic control group CG as an ad-
ditional counterfactual.
While the the ﬁrst estimator is considered standard, the second one took explicitly advan-
tage of  the separate control group to maximize unbiasedness of  results. To this extent,
we matched every bid bt with the corresponding average bid at the same round for the
control group, according to the following formula
b^t = bt   E (bct)
where E (bct) is the average bid for the control group at round t. The resulting ﬁrst
difference in bids becomes
bt   b^t 1 = (bt   bt 1) 

E (bct)  E
 
bct 1

: (3)
From this formulation it becomes clear that the observed ﬁrst difference in bids is deﬂated
by the corresponding change in the value of  average bids in the control group. Any
change in bids in the treated group that is related to the behavior of  the control group is
taken out by appropriate differencing.2
2Estimation of  eq. (1) using the standard ﬁxed effect method can produce biased results since the term
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3.5.2 Results
Overall, the two alternative speciﬁcations with and without the median bidders display
just trivial differences in the estimated coefﬁcients, while using the deﬁnition of bt pro-
vided by eq. 3 — with and without an explicit counterfactual — does make a difference.
Since using b^t in place of bt removes the variability due to the exposition of  bidders to
the median price, we ﬁnd that the effect size of  the ﬁrst adjustment term is lower when
we also use the CG. This pattern is present in both treated groups.
Finding 7 (Shaping effect) The estimated shaping effect is small and noisy.
We ﬁnd evidence of  a shaping effect for the TG1. The estimated effect is positive, which
reﬂects a tendency to adjust toward the median. Nonetheless, when we use the control
group as a counterfactual, the size of  the effect drops by 63%. In the TG2 the shaping
effect appears extremely noisy, with p-values uniformly distant from conventional levels
of  statistical signiﬁcance.
Finding 8 (Conformity effect) The conformity effect is stable and stronger than the shaping
effect, especially in TG2.
Across all estimates, the effect of  conformity is uniformly positive, though is more noisy in
the TG1. The TG2, on the contrary, has coefﬁcient values ranging from 87.3% to 47.4%:
this means that bidders did react to divergences between their bids and the average value
of  bids provided to them as additional information, though this clue is deﬁnitely norma-
tively irrelevant because of  the peculiar design of  this median price auction. Moreover,
in the TG2 the effect size of  conformity is always higher than the corresponding shap-
ing effect. This result suggests that in this context, additional normatively irrelevant
information does inﬂuence bidding behavior and that, comparatively, the provision of
information about groups of  bidders has a stronger effect than the median price. We
consider this result as evidence showing the relevance of  conformity over shaping.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we described the results from an experiment intended to test the differential
impact of  conformity and shaping behavior in the context of  a median price auction.
Using our control group, we found evidence supporting the shaping hypothesis: across
bt 1 appears on both sides of  the equation. To account for endogeneity, an Arellano-Bond type of  es-
timation is in order. Our results show effects of  roughly the same sign and order of  magnitude of  those
obtained using the conventional ﬁxed effect estimator. Nonetheless, the consistency of  this class of  estima-
tors holds only for n ! 1 and, given the small number of  subjects involved in the pilot experiment, we
have decided not to include the results of  the Arellano-Bond estimation in the present paper and to defer
a full exploration of  the results as the data from the actual experiment will become available.
9
rounds, the bids’ variance steadily declines and the average bid converges toward the
market median price.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd evidence supporting the hypothesis of  conformity in our ﬁrst
trated group, as the provision of  additional normatively irrelevant information prevents
variance’s shrinking, making it stationary over repetitions. More speciﬁcally, the infor-
mation on the bidding behaviour of  other fellow participants located at the same side
of  the distribution, either above or below the median, has a stronger inﬂuence than the
median price: this suggests that the shaping effect can be neutralized by some speciﬁc
type of  information.
In the second treatment group the bids’ variance is strictly lower than the bids’ vari-
ance for the control group. This implies that the information on the bidding behaviour of
other fellow participants located on the opposite side of  the distribution — i.e. above (be-
low) the median if  the relevant individual is below (above) the median — has a stronger
effect compared to the median price. These results are conﬁrmed by the estimates of  our
regression models which testify a stronger role for conformity compared to shaping.
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5 Tables and graphs
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Experimental group
Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Average bid 2.4 2.2 2.4
Standard deviation 0.7 0.9 0.6
Median bid 2.8 2.8 2.7
Subjects 7 9 12
Observations 56 72 96
Table 2
Tests of  effect
Meana Varianceb
(t) (c) t   c p t/c p
Treatment 1 Control -0.233 0.051 1.259 0.038
Treatment 2 Control -0.015 0.449 0.871 0.882
Treatment 2 Treatment 1 0.219 0.039 1.446 0.000
a H0 : t   c > 0:
b H0 : t/c > 1:
All reported p-values result from the appropriate unidirectional test.
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Figure 1
The value of  average bids
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The standard deviation of  bids
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Figure 3
The market median bid
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The boxplot of  the three experimental groups
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5.2 Regression models
Table 3
Partial adjustment model
Fixed effects estimation for control group
Variable Coef. p-value
Adjustment term 1 0.380 (0.000)
Constant -0.031 (0.191)
1 The dependent variable is (bt   bt 1), that is, the difference between
current and previous bid for the i-th player. The subscript i is omitted
to avoid clutter.
2 The ﬁrst adjustment term is (pmedt 1   bt 1) reﬂecting the difference
between previous stage’s median price and player’s bid.
14
Ta
bl
e
4
Pa
rti
al
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t m
od
el
Fi
xe
d 
ef
fe
ct
s e
sti
m
at
io
n 
fo
r t
re
at
ed
 g
ro
up
s
C
om
pl
et
e 
gr
ou
p
W
it
ho
ut
 m
ed
ia
n 
bi
dd
er
s
N
o 
co
nt
ro
l
C
on
tr
ol
N
o 
co
nt
ro
l
C
on
tr
ol
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 1
C
oe
f.
p-
va
lu
e
C
oe
f.
p-
va
lu
e
C
oe
f.
p-
va
lu
e
C
oe
f.
p-
va
lu
e
A
dj
us
tm
en
t t
er
m
 1
1.0
39
(0
.0
00
)
0.
34
1
(0
.0
14
)
1.0
39
(0
.0
00
)
0.
38
9
(0
.0
15
)
A
dj
us
tm
en
t t
er
m
 2
0.
117
(0
.50
7)
1.1
69
(0
.0
00
)
0.
117
(0
.51
0)
1.0
96
(0
.0
01
)
D
um
m
y 
fo
r a
dd
iti
on
al
 in
fo
 p
ro
vi
de
d
0.
00
8
(0
.74
3)
-0
.23
7
(0
.0
00
)
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 2
A
dj
us
tm
en
t t
er
m
 1
-0
.51
8
(0
.25
2)
-0
.0
36
(0
.8
40
)
-0
.53
9
(0
.4
75
)
-0
.13
1
(0
.8
14
)
A
dj
us
tm
en
t t
er
m
 2
0.
78
3
(0
.0
04
)
0.
47
4
(0
.0
00
)
0.
87
3
(0
.3
37
)
0.
62
7
(0
.0
06
)
D
um
m
y 
fo
r a
dd
iti
on
al
 in
fo
 p
ro
vi
de
d
0.
113
(0
.0
91
)
0.
16
2
(0
.0
13
)
1
T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
is
(b
t
 
b t
 
1
),
th
at
 is
,t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
we
en
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 p
re
vi
ou
s b
id
 fo
r t
he
i-t
h 
pl
ay
er
.T
he
 su
bs
cr
ip
ti
is 
om
itt
ed
 to
 a
vo
id
 c
lu
tte
r.
2
T
he
 co
lu
m
ns
 w
ith
 th
e 
he
ad
in
g
No
 co
ntr
ol
di
sp
la
y 
m
od
el
s e
m
pl
oy
in
g 
ju
st 
th
e 
da
ta
 fr
om
 th
e 
tre
at
ed
 g
ro
up
,w
he
re
as
 th
e 
co
lu
m
ns
 w
ith
th
e 
he
ad
in
g
Co
ntr
ol
di
sp
la
y 
m
od
el
s o
bt
ai
ne
d 
us
in
g 
th
e 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
 a
s a
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t c
ou
nt
er
fa
ct
ua
l.
3
T
he
 ﬁ
rs
t a
dj
us
tm
en
t t
er
m
 is
(p
m
ed
t 
1
 
b t
 
1
)
re
ﬂe
ct
in
g 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
pr
ev
io
us
 st
ag
e’s
 m
ed
ia
n 
pr
ic
e 
an
d 
pl
ay
er
’s 
bi
d.
4
T
he
 se
co
nd
 ad
ju
stm
en
t t
er
m
 is
(r
t 
1
 b
t 
1
)/
(1
+

r t 
1
)
re
ﬂe
ct
in
g 
th
e d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
we
en
 p
re
vi
ou
s s
ta
ge
’s 
av
er
ag
e p
ric
e i
nf
or
m
at
io
n
pr
ov
id
ed
 a
nd
 p
la
ye
r’s
 b
id
,d
isc
ou
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
sta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n 
of
 p
ric
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
ov
id
ed
.
5
A
ll 
re
po
rte
d
p
-v
al
ue
s b
oo
tst
ra
pp
ed
 w
ith
 1,
00
0 
re
pe
tit
io
ns
.
15
References
Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des
postulats et axiomes de l’ecole américaine. Econometrica 21(4), 503–546.
Ariely, D., G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec (2003). ’coherent arbitrariness’: Stable demand
curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of  Economics 118(1), 73–106.
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of  independence and conformity: I. a minority of  one against
a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied 70(9), 1–70.
Bernheim, B. D. (1998). A theory of  conformity. Journal of  Political Economy 102(5), 841–77.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirshleifer, and I. Welch (1998). Learning from the behavior of
others: Conformity, fads, and informational cascades. The Journal of  Economic Perspec-
tives 12(3), 151–170.
Butler, D. J. and G. C. Loomes (2007). Imprecision as an account of  the preference
reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review 97(1), 277–297.
Efferson, C., R. Lalive, P. J. Richerson, R. McElreath, and M. Lubell (2008). Conformists
and mavericks: The empirics of  frequency-dependent cultural transmission. Evolution
and Human Behavior 29(1), 56–64.
Haun, D., E. van Leeuwen, M. Edelson, et al. (2013). Majority inﬂuence in children and
other animals. Developmental cognitive neuroscience 3, 61–71.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of  decision under
risk. Econometrica 47(2), 263–291.
Klick, J. and F. Parisi (2008). Social networks, self-denial, and median preferences: Con-
formity as an evolutionary strategy. Journal of  Socio-Economics 37(4), 1319–1327.
Loomes, G., C. Starmer, and R. Sugden (2003). Do anomalies disappear in repeated
markets? The Economic Journal 113(486), C153–C166.
Loomes, G., C. Starmer, and R. Sugden (2010). Preference reversals and disparities
between willingness to pay and willingness to accept in repeated markets. Journal of
Economic Psychology 31(3), 374–387.
Morgan, T. J. H. and K. N. Laland (2012). The biological bases of  conformity. Frontiers in
Neuroscience 6, 87.
Tufano, F. (2010). Are ‘true’preferences revealed in repeated markets? an experimental
demonstration of  context-dependent valuations. Experimental Economics 13(1), 1–13.
16
van de Waal, E., C. Borgeaud, A. Whiten, T. Inomata, D. Triadan, K. Aoyama,
V. Castillo, H. Yonenobu, Y. Chen, G. W. Dorn, et al. (2013). Potent social learning
and conformity shape a wild primate’s foraging decisions. Science 340(6131), 483–485.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The
Journal of  Finance 16(1), 8–37.
17
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 
UNIVERSITY OF TORINO 
Corso Unione Sovietica 218 bis - 10134 Torino (ITALY) 
Web page: http://esomas.econ.unito.it/ 
